C O M M E N T A R Y
rimum non nocere ("First, do no harm") is an ancient reminder that patients should not be subjected to unsafe or harmful medical practices. In recent years, concern over harm to patients has gained renewed attention. Patient injury and death due to errors resulting from unsafe processes in healthcare was highlighted by the 1999 Institute of Medicine's report "To err is human." 1 The need to reassert patient safety as a top priority cuts across all branches of healthcare and includes transfusion medicine. This paper summarizes the 2002 Emily Cooley lecture, which called for a realignment of priorities in the field of transfusion medicine away from excess attention to the component and toward the interests of the patient.
Transfusion safety is concerned with the overall process of delivering transfusion care to the patient. During the past three decades, resources devoted to the quality of the blood component have resulted in impressive improvements in blood safety. However, overall transfusion safety, largely the province of hospitals, has received far less attention. As a result, serious problems exist at each step of the hospital process of transfusion care. High rates of mislabeled and completely miscollected patient samples have been documented. The physician's decision to transfuse is hampered by the absence of controlled clinical trials and the absence of formal training in transfusion therapies. The final bedside check required to insure that the unit is intended for the recipient is often performed either incompletely or incorrectly, resulting in millions of unsafe transfusion episodes each year. Mistransfusion of blood remains the single most common serious hazard of transfusion, is the most likely cause of death attributed to transfusion, and occurs at a rate thousands of times higher than transfusion-transmitted HCV and HIV combined.
Solutions to current problems in hospital transfusion safety can be grouped into three categories: First, new technology designed to improve patient safety should be explored. Machine-readable patient identification wrist-P bands, smart pumps, and radio-frequency smart labels may reduce transfusion errors. Nanotechnology holds great promise to improve clinical decision-making regarding transfusion, and computerized blood utilization review (CBUR) can provide timely and useful educational feedback to prescribing physicians. Second, a new position-the transfusion safety officer (TSO)-charged with the responsibility for improving the process of transfusion care outside the laboratory should be developed in the US. TSOs have already been deployed in several nations to identify and resolve latent organizational weakness leading to unsafe transfusion practice. Third, professional societies should become advocates for patient welfare by setting performance standards in key areas of the transfusion process including the collection of patient samples, bedside blood administration, and staffing levels in laboratories directly responsible for blood support of patients. Clinical research is urgently needed to define better the indications for transfusion and to explicitly evaluate proposed new safety interventions. Hospital transfusion safety represents a top priority for the profession of transfusion medicine.
TRANSFUSION SAFETY: MORE THAN JUST BLOOD SAFETY
Safe transfusion therapy depends upon an interrelated series of processes shown in Fig. 1 . Transfusion safety can be distinguished from blood safety . Blood safety concerns the safety of the component. Blood safety is largely the responsibility of blood collectors and has been a primary focus of both regulators and standard-setting agencies in the blood industry. Transfusion safety, in contrast, focuses on the overall process that results in delivery of transfusion therapies to patients. Transfusion safety includes blood safety but also includes additional critical steps that relate to the medical use of components and the outcome of the patient. These latter steps occur largely within the hospital. The past three decades have witnessed tremendous improvements in blood safety. Enormous resourcesfinancial, intellectual, technological, and governmentalhave been invested in improving the purity, potency, and safety of the blood that is collected, tested, packaged, and labeled as suitable for transfusion. Much of this effort was fueled by and continues to be driven by concern over transfusion-transmitted infections. Increased scrutiny of donors, highly sensitive EIA testing, NAT, WBC reduction, the widespread application of good manufacturing prac-tices applied to blood component preparation, enormous investment in chemical pathogen inactivation, and recent new initiatives to reduce the risk of bacterial contamination have all contributed to a marked reduction in the transfusion-transmitted infections. These efforts have resulted in a measurable and dramatic reduction in the risk of transfusion related HIV and HCV-the two most substantial transfusion-transmitted infections of the 20th century.
While we should take pride in the successes achieved in improving the safety of blood as a component, we must also admit to the lack of progress made in other aspects of transfusion safety-including noninfectious hazards and risks related to hospital-based steps in transfusion care. 2 A measure of the current residual risk of transfusion is shown in Fig. 2 . The figure displays estimates of the risk of blood against a background of vertical lines representing log orders of magnitude (Paling scale). The figure illustrates three points. First, infectious hazards are now far out-weighed by noninfectious risks of transfusion. Indeed, some noninfectious risks are now on the order of 10,000 times more common than HIV transmission via transfusion. Second, the range of risk estimate represented by the width of the bars in the figure is much smaller for viral hazards like HIV and HCV because, as a profession, we have invested the resources to develop good point estimates for their frequency. In contrast, many noninfectious hazards have not been sufficiently studied, and as a result we have very uncertain risk estimates that cover a broad range. This uncertainty could be addressed by better research designed to determine the actual incidence of noninfectious hazards. Third, the greatest risks to patients derive from problems that are within our power to solve.
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THREE DANGEROUS FOCAL POINTS IN THE TRANSFUSION PROCESS
The three focal points in the process of blood transfusion most in need of improvement are the collection of patient samples, the medical decision to transfuse, and the bedside administration of blood components. Each of these areas lies outside the immediate practice areas of the laboratory. Indeed, the current weaknesses in these three steps may be attributed in part to the failure of transfusion medicine specialists to recognize them as critical components of the overall delivery of transfusion care, to take ownership of their performance, and to take responsibility for their improvement. National professional societies and government agencies have also failed to adequately define these steps as key components of the profession.
Focal point 1: patient sample collection
From the perspective of the patient, the collection of a pretransfusion sample is the first step on the path to transfusion. Errors in pretransfusion sample collection can be devastating because they can initiate a chain of events leading to ABO mistransfusion. Linden et al. 3 estimated that errors in pretransfusion sample collection accounted for 15 percent of ABO-mismatched transfusions reported to New York State-a substantial proportion of these avoidable mishaps. Of even greater concern is the suggestion that these errors are on the increase. For example, Butch et al. 4 reported that during the period from 1993 to 1999, the percentage of total laboratory errors related to patient sample collection rose from 10 to 20 percent. Because the total reported errors also doubled during this same period, the hospital actually witnessed a four-fold increase in the absolute rate of phlebotomy errors. Rising error rates in sample collection are entirely plausible and would be expected to result from cut-backs in hospital staffing, high turn-over rates and truncated training of phlebotomists, and lack of attention to system-wide failures in patient identification and sample labeling. Two simple measures of the rate of error in patient sample collection are the rate of mislabeled samples and the rate of miscollected samples. Here, I define mislabeled samples as those whose labeling does not meet local criteria for accessioning into the laboratory and define miscollected samples as those in which a properly labeled tube identifying blood from Patient A actually contains blood from Patient B. This latter important error is also referred to as "wrong blood in tube" (WBIT) and can only be identified by comparing results on a repeat sample with historical records for that patient. WBIT represents a critical "near-miss" error and a practical indicator of an unsafe process for patients. Error rates during sample collection have been estimated in a limited number of published studies. 5, 6 Lumadue et al. 7 reported that at Johns Hopkins hospital in Baltimore, one in every 71 samples were mislabeled and one in 2800 were correctly labeled but miscollected and contained WBIT. They noted that samples with an error in labeling were 40-fold more likely to contain WBIT, suggesting that seemingly trivial labeling errors may, in fact, "flag" a process with more serious underlying faults. Recently, the Biomedical Excellence for Safer Transfusion Working Party of the International Society of Blood Transfusion reported a large international study on the performance of sample collection used for pretransfusion testing. 8 The study was conducted in 10 countries involving nearly 700,000 samples. They found that among the 62 participating hospitals, the median hospital performance resulted in a process in which 1 in every 165 samples was mislabeled and 1 in every 1986 samples was miscollected and contained WBIT. For hospitals at the 25th percentile of performance, one in every 1155 samples contained WBIT. A striking finding was that the rate of miscollected samples was similar in nearly all participating countries, suggesting that serious errors in sample collection are endemic. The authors recommended that individual countries repeat the study using a representative sampling of hospitals within their borders and that such results be used to formulate national performance standards (see below).
The timing of pretransfusion testing is also unsafe for many patients with alloantibodies who undergo surgery, especially the growing numbers of patients assigned to "same-day" surgery. In a study conducted by the College of American Pathologists, Friedberg et al. 9 reported on nearly 9000 presurgical type and screen studies. Among same-day surgery samples, the median hospital failed in 23 percent of cases to complete the type and screen before the beginning of surgery. For 10 percent of hospitals, more than 75 percent of patients went to same-day surgery before completion of the type and screen. The authors concluded that large numbers of patients ". . . are unnecessarily being placed at risk by inadequate mechanisms to ensure available blood for surgery."
Focal point 2: the decision to transfuse
With little or no formal training during medical school in the clinical indications for blood transfusion therapies, it is not surprising that nearly all physicians, surgeons, and anesthesiologists have developed patterns of blood usage that were passed down during residency training from their peers. This system has fostered a verbal tradition of blood usage in which old "rules," often perilously out of date, are used to decide when to transfuse. Decisions to transfuse blood are made by a wide range of physicians and applied to an equally broad range of illnesses. Blooduse decisions are probably more akin to those applied to common antibiotics than to those applied to specialized medicines like chemotherapy agents or seizure-control medications. Like decisions associated with commonly prescribed antibiotics, it is perhaps not surprising that many transfusion decisions are ill informed, outdated, or simply incorrect.
Coupled with the lack of formal training about the proper use of blood therapy is the equally disturbing absence of well-designed randomized trials on the proper indications for basic blood components. For example, while fresh-frozen plasma (FFP) is the third most commonly prescribed blood component, there are virtually no studies that provide objective evidence to determine its proper clinical use. Misuse of FFP is undoubtedly rampant. For example, an audit at my hospital of over 2000 units of FFP administered outside of surgery documented that 33 percent of requests (consuming 34% of FFP distributed) were to "treat" patients with an elevated prothrombin time (PT) international normalized ratio (INR) before invasive procedures despite the absence of any controlled studies suggesting that FFP is appropriate for this indication. Published studies of the use of specific blood components have generally only been able to conclude that practice patterns vary widely among different hospitals and among different practitioners within the same hospital. 10, 11 Clinical research is urgently needed to refine the indications for use of all major blood components.
Focal point 3: bedside administration of blood
Transfusion of blood to the wrong patient (mistransfusion) is the most common serious hazard of transfusion. By administering blood without protection against ABO mismatching, mistransfusion subjects the patient to a level of care found in the 19th century. In this sense, mistransfusion produces a level of medical practice akin to surgery without anesthesia, diagnosis without radiology, or treatment of infection without antibiotics. Thus, the bedside clerical check-done by humans in a manner little changed in 50 years and without the advantage of any new technology-is all that separates the 21st century patient from the 19th century consequences of transfu-sion. Data from multiple sources document that mistransfusion errors are serious and unacceptably common. Mistransfusion has consistently been the leading cause of death from transfusion reported to the FDA since such reporting was required. 12 As shown in Fig. 3 , the Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) program in England documents that mistransfusion accounts for the overwhelming majority of reported events. 13 When the data from SHOT are further analyzed to only include those events that result in either death or substantial morbidity to the recipient, the importance of mistransfusion is unchanged. See Fig. 4 . Because SHOT tracks mishaps that occur to individuals, the data represent the risk expressed per patient (rather than per unit) and thus can be viewed as the patient's view of the profession's "performance report."
Other sources report very similar results. Linden et al.
14 estimated the rate of transfusion error to be 1 in 12,000 in New York State. Robillard et al. 15 reports that the hemovigilance program in Quebec identified ABO mistransfusion as the most common major adverse event occurring at a rate of 1 in 13,000 transfusions. Andreu et al. 16 reports similar findings from the hemovigilance program in France. Yet, the true incidence of mistransfusion is undoubtedly higher due to failure to recognize many errors. In a very provocative study conducted in three university hospitals in Belgium, Baele et al. 17 tracked transfusions and performed an active audit of the rate of mistransfusion. They uncovered numerous instances of mistransfusion that went unrecognized and would therefore go unreported under current passive systems used by the profession to establish priorities. With active tracking, they reported the astonishing estimate that 1 in 400 units were mistransfused and estimated that the true frequency of errors in bedside blood administration were 30-fold higher than those reported in current passive reporting systems. Thus, even though passive reporting systems identify mistransfusion as the most commonly reported serious transfusion error, its true frequency is likely to be considerably higher.
Patient safeguards to prevent mistransfusion are inadequate. Previous published studies have repeatedly documented weaknesses in performance of the bedside clerical check. [18] [19] [20] Of particular concern is the suggestion that the process has likely eroded in recent decades, perhaps due to increasing patient-to-nurse ratios, elimination of specialty nursing teams responsible for administering blood, shorter lengths of stay in hospital, higher nursing turn-over rates, and other unrecognized factors. The College of American Pathologists recently published evidence documenting a decline in the performance of the bedside check. 21 Two audits were performed-one in 1994 and one in 2000. These audits assessed the frequency with which basic elements of the bedside check were performed including positive patient identification, matching wristband identification to the blood compatibility label, matching patient identifiers with the blood request, and review of compatibility and expiration date information. In all categories, there was a substantial decline in the percentage of transfusions that were correctly checked at the bedside between the years 1994 and 2000. Equally disturbing was the actual frequency that checks failed to be performed. For example, in the year 2000, the audit of over 4000 transfusions revealed a failure to match wristband identification with the compatibility label in 25 percent of transfusions. Nationally, this translates into literally millions of episodes in which patients are not provided basic safeguards against the most common serious hazard of transfusion. 
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF TRANSFUSION SAFETY
Solutions that would enhance transfusion safety and promote the welfare of patients abound. Solutions have already been developed and implemented in other industries such as the airline industry, the nuclear power industry, and (to a lesser extent) the automotive industry. For example, the airline industry promotes an enterprise-wide culture of safety; invests resources in both process (flight) and component (aircraft) safety; and uses direct observational in-flight audits, a nonpunitive and nonpublic industry-wide error-reporting system, and technology such as in-flight recorders to analyze near-miss events. For transfusion, solutions to current unsafe patient conditions can be grouped into three categories-new technology, human solutions, and professional standards. Clinical research is needed to evaluate and refine all three.
New technology
New technology has led the way toward improved blood component safety. That modern technology has not been applied to basic processes of patient identification, sample collection, and the bedside administration of blood is a serious and striking failing that can be corrected. A variety of new technologies exist that can be used to improve transfusion safety (Table 1) . Machine readable patient identification: bar codes or radio-frequency chips? Better patient identification is a fundamental starting point for improved patient safety and will reap rewards in transfusion, medication administration, radiology, laboratory medicine, and surgery. Although bar-code technology has been in use for decades, it has not been applied to patient identification at the bedside. This may seem particularly surprising because bar coding is established in everyday activities from the supermarket checkout counter to airport luggage tags. It is especially frustrating that bar coding has not been adopted in the bedside transfusion check given the fact that all blood containers have been bar coded for many years. Yet, the failure to adopt bar coding at the bedside may contain several important lessons. First, it may reflect the absence of hospital financial incentives to adopt new technology oriented toward patient safety (see below). Second, its lackluster use at the bedside despite universal use on blood containers may suggest that current FDA initiatives to promote bar coding on medication containers may not translate into a patient safety initiative. Finally, the failure to adopt bar coding may simply reflect its unsuitability for bedside use. Bar coding requires line-ofsight so that a handheld laser can read a flat surface with the code. These constraints may represent important practical obstacles to its acceptance and suggest the need to explore other identification technologies.
"Smart tags" using radio-frequency identification (RFID) consist of small chips with an antennae that communicate at a specific radio frequency. Data can be written to the chip and in turn read by a "reader." RFID smart tags are replacing "keys" as a means to gain access to buildings, parking areas, and other secure sites. Millions are used to identify vehicles at drive-through tollbooths and hundreds of millions as automobile-access "clickers." Many hospital employees currently wear RFID tags that contain the employee's identification. Because smart tags do not require line-of-sight to be read, they may have distinct advantages for bedside use in healthcare especially when applied to patient wristbands in combination with eye-readable text. Hospital components, from units of blood to vials of medications, could be labeled with disposable smart tags. Unlike a barcode, RFID tags do not require that the user actively seek the information imbedded in the label. Unlike active chips used on automobiles or cellular phones, "passive" smart tags have no battery and do not emit energy continuously. Rather, passive tags take their energy from the reader and will communicate only when they are in the proximity of the reader. Chip readers can be designed in almost any shape. If chip readers are made to fit seamlessly into the process of the bedside administration of blood, then units tagged with a disposable, inexpensive, passive RFID chip will be read automatically at the time of transfusion. Alternatively, if chip readers are poorly designed and do not fit into the process of transfusion, then users may ignore the technology and it will fail. Clinical studies need to be done to explore the potential of bar coding and RFID technology to improve patient safety. Because acceptance within the hospital is much more likely to occur if a single technology is used for both medication delivery and blood transfusion, transfusion medicine and the pharmacy should work together to identify which form of machine-readable technology will best serve patient safety.
Nanotechnology. Exciting progress is being made in the application of nanotechnology in healthcare. Applications particularly relevant to transfusion practice are the development of sensors capable of reading and transmitting analytes such as oxygen, pH, and lactate. These devices have become incredibly small (Fig. 5) . In the nottoo-distant future, we may be able to implant tiny sensors in key tissue locations that would provide real-time reporting of the state of tissue oxygenation. Such devices would revolutionize the decision to transfuse RBCs by providing the means to make a decision based on physiologic local oxygen delivery rather than the current assessment of the global Hb content of blood. Localized testing of coagulation at critical anatomic sites would revolutionize the practice of coagulation therapy and eliminate its current dependence on the laboratory assessment of a blood sample that bears little direct relationship to the site of bleeding. The decades to come may see the decision to transfuse guided by the application of miniature devices capable of local physiologic readout.
CBUR and feedback. Physicians continuously learn from their practice and are genuinely interested in delivering the best possible medical care. For transfusion decisions, physicians rarely receive feedback given in a timely and educational format. The sheer number of blood requests in any busy hospital makes review and feedback virtually impossible using manual methods.
CBUR is a system in which each request for blood can be reviewed against local pre-established criteria. Requests not meeting institutional guidelines can serve to initiate educational feedback to clinicians. Several different CBUR systems have been developed at various hospitals including systems that intervene before the request is filled and systems that review requests retrospectively. [22] [23] [24] Due to computer-processing speeds, CBUR allows timely review of all requests from all treating physicians. It thus provides far more comprehensive and timely feedback than systems dependent on a quarterly review of a selected sample of medical records. 25 The CBUR program at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston reviews all requests for blood components. Given the urgency of transfusion in a hospital the size of Massachusetts General Hospital, we chose to implement a system that reviews the decision to transfuse within 24 hours of the request. This also allows for analysis of posttransfusion data and improves the content of the feedback to clinicians. Each morning at 04:00 hours, the computer compiles demographic information, pretransfusion data, and existing posttransfusion laboratory values on all patients transfused with any component during the previous 24 hours. In a typical day, 75 to 100 transfusions are screened using an age-adjusted algorithm that identifies transfusions that merit additional review by a senior transfusion medicine physician. After this individualized review, an e-mail is sent to both the ordering physician and the attending physician for those residual transfusions that do not meet local guidelines. The e-mail has a hypertext link to a local intranet site that gives additional information on the current knowledge base for transfusing blood components. This site has a one-click link to published literature for those clinicians who seek additional information. The CBUR system has been in place since the year 2000 and has been well received by clinicians who are generally eager to adopt best practice, provided that the information is delivered in a clear and concise format. In the future, we plan to enhance the CBUR algorithm to include measures of cardiac index, EKG results, troponin levels, use of pressor agents, and oxygen saturation data. However, as noted by Kanter, 26 the true impact of CBUR remains uncertain and would be an ideal subject for a controlled multicenter trial.
Human solutions: the hospital TSO
During the past decade many blood establishments created compliance officers who have been part of the "human solution" to improved blood safety. One can think of TSOs as the individual with equivalent responsibility for transfusion safety. There is strong evidence from hemovigilance programs and error-reporting systems that most serious hazards of transfusion result from errors that occur outside the laboratory. 3 Currently, the steps in the transfusion process that occur outside the laboratory are the partial responsibility of several hospital services and the full responsibility of none. With no one immediately responsible for oversight of those transfusion steps that occur outside the laboratory, it is little wonder that serious lapses, misunderstandings, knowledge gaps, and errors may occur. The principal role of the hospital TSO is to work outside the laboratory to improve patient safety during transfusion. Some of the goals and activities of a hospital TSO are listed in Table 2 .
TSOs already exist in other nations. There is precedent in the US for employment of individuals with responsibilities analogous to TSOs. For example, medication use is a complex activity that carries high risk for error. Many hospitals have deployed pharmacists outside the pharmacy working in patient care units. These individuals attend patient-care rounds, act as a resource to prescribing physicians, monitor current medication-delivery systems, and work with nursing services to reduce errors. Because of the risks to uninfected patients from the spread of infection, hospitals have established infection control officers (generally drawn from nursing services) who monitor antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections and improve processes used to isolate infected patients. TSOs are similar to these individuals but bring a unique focus and responsibility for safe blood-related therapies.
Nevertheless, the US has lagged behind other nations that have already developed TSO positions adapted to their national systems of healthcare. In France, the Etablissement Francais du Sang employs some 2000 individuals called "hemovigilance correspondents" who function as TSOs and cover 95 percent of all hospital transfusion activity. These individuals are generally physicians drawn from hematology or anesthesiology who have part-time responsibility for transfusion safety. Large hospitals employ full-time physician TSOs who participate actively in the national program of transfusion safety and process improvement.
England currently has approximately 45 TSOs (called specialist practitioners of transfusion) employed among the 340 hospitals where blood is transfused. To further support the development of TSOs, the National Blood Service in England has developed a pilot program employing 10 transfusion liaison nurses. This program would be analogous in the US to a program organized by blood centers to provide nurses assisting in transfusion safety initiatives in hospitals.
The Ministry of Health of the Province of Quebec established a regional system of TSOs in 1998. The first such system in North America, it consists of 45 TSOs stationed in the 20 hospitals that account for 80 percent of the blood transfused throughout the province. A typical hospital has two TSOs-one individual (often originally trained as a technologist) functions as a compliance officer, while the other individual (usually trained originally as a nurse) works outside the laboratory as a patient safety advocate. Canadian TSOs undergo formal training that includes instruction in transfusion medicine, epidemiology and statistics, transfusion hazards, error management, and reporting. They drive the hemovigilance program and report to the Ministry of Health using a webbased standard reporting format. The program quickly developed data on region-wide transfusion hazards that were used to establish priorities for setting transfusion policy by the Ministry. Recently, a decision was made by the Canadian government to generalize the program throughout the nation.
Obstacles to the deployment of TSOs in the US. It may appear paradoxical that hospitals which hold the health and well-being of the patient as their core goal have not created professional staff positions devoted exclusively to transfusion safety. This failure may reflect the fact that hospital leaders, like most healthcare workers and like the general public, remain focused on blood safety and the infectious hazards of transfusion. This suggests that more published research is required to highlight the current risks of transfusion. Unfortunately, hospitals are unlikely to fund new staff positions even though TSOs are expected to be highly cost effective relative to other investments in blood transfusion. For example, the creation of one nurse TSO for every 20,000 RBCs transfused would represent an incremental cost of less than $3 for each cellular blood component transfused. This cost is trivial compared with the incremental expenditures by these same hospitals to purchase recent technologies that have been applied to blood. These technologies (and more to come) are often not substantiated by controlled trials and are promoted by appeal to the "precautionary principle"-a principal that appears to have been always selectively applied to product risks.
Professional societies can play a role as advocates for the patient
The need for professional performance standards related to patient safety. The emphasis placed by Pro-
TABLE 2. Goals and activities of hospital TSOs
• To work interdepartmentally and outside the laboratory to promote safe and effective transfusion therapy • To track hospital performance of key processes by:
Active surveillance (observation audits) of patient sample collection, blood requests, blood delivery, and bedside administration of blood components Tracking data on key indicators of the transfusion process Participating in overall program of error and/or accident reporting Reporting to the hospital Transfusion Practice Committee and hospital management • To oversee implementation of approved changes in the process of blood therapy • To educate staff (nursing, physician) to recognize and report transfusion reactions and disseminate information on hospital guidelines for appropriate blood usage • To provide "basic training" for new physician staff responsible for administering blood in high usage areas (e.g., anesthesia residents, emergency room personnel) • To contribute to improving processes for blood utilization review • To participate in implementation of new technology designed to enhance patient safety fessional Societies on the component (blood safety) rather than on the patient (transfusion safety) is clearly reflected in existing professional standards. Countries throughout the world have established detailed and complex standards that define the purity, potency, and safety of blood components. For example, standards for platelet preparation identify not only the minimum acceptable platelet content but also the minimum proportion of units meeting standards (i.e., the frequency of good performance). Some component standards have remarkable complexity. Consider, for example, standards for WBC-reduced blood, which in many countries require that a stated proportion of units must meet a stated threshold level of WBCs with a specific degree of statistical confidence when assayed using validated systems. Component standards define acceptable performance and require investigation and process re-engineering should measured outcomes fall out of compliance. In sharp contrast, there is worldwide lack of performance standards related to patient safety. Surprisingly, no country has established standards that define how often hospitals should correctly perform any one of the following four critical areas of transfusion safety: patient sample collection, release of blood from the laboratory to the patient-care area, bedside administration of blood, and monitoring safety and effectiveness of transfusion. Because no requirements exist, many hospitals do not even monitor these critical steps and are completely unaware of their performance in these areas. Professional societies have the opportunity to take a leadership role in this area and can develop practical performance standards by working with a sentinel group of hospitals representative of current care.
The impact of performance standards. Performance standards focusing on key steps in the transfusion process would reassert the commitment of professional societies to patients. Performance standards focused on patient safety are a natural extension of blood component standards. Performance standards would give hospitals clear direction and a strong incentive to monitor current systems for the delivery of transfusion therapy. More importantly, national performance standards would empower laboratories to advocate for improvement within their facilities when needed. Hospitals committed to quality healthcare, agencies involved in accreditation of hospitals, and regulatory (or legal) bodies concerned with patient safety would all be served by professional performance standards related to transfusion safety.
Three examples of performance standards designed to enhance patient safety are: Bedside blood administration. Few facilities audit by direct observation the frequency with which the identity of patients and units are properly matched at the time of transfusion. The current failure to monitor the bedside check may be largely due to lack of personnel-a shortcoming that would be corrected by the deployment of TSOs. Direct audits would generate performance data that could be compared to a standard, tracked over time, and used to signal need for process improvement. However, the creation of a national benchmark standard will first require consensus on the elements that constitute the minimum appropriate bedside check. As with patient sample collection, the goal of a national performance standard would be to achieve a process with a negligible error rate. 3. Staffing levels in hospital transfusion service. An insufficient number of skilled laboratory staff undoubtedly contributes to errors in the transfusion service, especially given the episodic and urgent nature of many blood requests. Decreasing numbers of training programs in medical technology, chronic staff vacancies, and a rising national average age of medical technologists all reflect a diminishing workforce despite a rising number of transfusions nationally. The great wave of "baby boomers" soon to require healthcare travels on a direct collision course with the dwindling transfusion workforce. The contribution of staff shortages toward unsafe conditions among hospitalized patients has been most thoroughly assessed in nursing services. 27 A Health Policy Report in The New England Journal of Medicine describes the pros and cons surrounding legislative efforts that would require a benchmark number of nurses per patient bed. In a similar fashion, our profession may soon need to determine the minimum number of qualified staff required to provide basic transfusion services. Tracking staff levels over time among a sentinel group of hospitals would provide valuable data that is easy to obtain. Rough benchmarks could be formulated in several ways-for example, the number of full time equivalents (FTEs) per 1000 blood requests.
THE MEDICAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: OBSTACLE OR PATHWAY TO IMPROVED PATIENT SAFETY?
Manufacturers, government agencies, professional societies, blood collectors, hospitals, and healthcare practitioners represent a medical-industrial complex of transfusion care. Hospitals are largely unaware of the extent to which they practice unsafe transfusion care. Required to purchase blood from suppliers at increasing costs while at the same time pressured to reduce expenditures for the delivery of healthcare, hospitals have focused almost exclusively on blood prices and have not invested in revitalizing the systems designed to deliver safe blood therapies. The blood industry-outside of the hospitalhas responded to societal demands for safer blood fueled by a media that remains focused on infectious hazards regardless how remote the threat. The industry response has in some cases been remarkably productive and improved blood safety, and at other times has been far more self-serving and profit seeking. Transfusion medicine professionals in hospitals-hugely outnumbered by those requesting and administering blood services and traditionally without political control over activities beyond the confines of the laboratory-have either capitulated to the societal demand for blood safety at any cost or have simply looked aside when facing the prospect of trying to change with limited resources a flawed hospital delivery system. Yet each of these parties (manufacturers, regulators, professional societies, blood suppliers, hospital administrators, and transfusion medicine professionals) share a common interest in the welfare of the patient. Why, then, have problems in overall transfusion safety gone uncorrected? I believe that one of the reasons we have made so little progress in advancing the process of safe transfusion is that those who would advocate for it have been poorly organized and have not adequately made clear the need for change. Instead, change in our profession has been driven largely by those who are natural advocates for improvement in the component. It must also be recognized that improvements to the component have cost money. If we are to make any progress to improve the overall process of transfusion therapy, then we will have to share resources, balancing improvements in the component with improvements to the process. The economic reality of the past two decades, however, has been a flow of resources out of the hospital to pay for increasing technology applied to the component. I have no doubt that this has served to decrease our ability to address hospital shortcomings in safe transfusion. For example, in my hospital this year, budgetary requests for TSOs, for improved computerized monitoring of the clinical use of blood, and for machine-readable wrist banding were all denied. The reason, in part, stems from the high price paid for blood component enhancements, some of unproven patient benefit. I recognize that the current political and economic reality is driven by a system that has largely defined itself by component safety, and yet, I believe each of us recognizes that our professional responsibility goes beyond the fluid in the bag and that we share a mutual ultimate obligation to the patient.
In conclusion, whether measured as the risk per unit or assessed by reports from hemovigilance programs around the world, there can be little doubt that patients are currently put at greatest risk and harm due to problems with the process of safe transfusion. We need to confront this fact and to re-establish hospital transfusion safety (not simply blood safety) as a new priority in transfusion medicine. I urge each of us to rethink our priorities and to establish a new agenda that will address current weaknesses, failures, and opportunities in the hospital delivery of safe transfusion care. I call upon each of us to rededicate ourselves to placing the interests of the patient as the most fundamental goal of our profession, remembering that more important than the blood itself is the welfare of those who receive it.
